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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
years after the Supreme Court's construction of section twenty of that
aCt,2S intentionally omitted that section from the Illinois Act.24 Without
this definition clause, the wording of the act seems broad enough to permit
an opposite result to that reached in the present case. On the other hand
the adherence to legislative intent in interpreting the statute yielded in
this case to the policy consideration that an employer who can satisfy his
employees as to wages, hours, conditions, et cetera, should not be subjected
to economic pressure from third parties without some relief from the
courts. It is suggested that this view is the more reasonable upon the
particular facts. However, in Illinois, labor will have this precedent to
face in cases where picketing is economically justifiable because of poor
wages, hours, and conditions which the employees themselves are cowed
into accepting.25  S. M. M.
SALEs-IMPLIED WARRANTY-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO CONSUMER
IN SALE OF Foo---[California].--Plaintiff Klein purchased from a retailer
a sandwich manufactured, packaged, and sold to the retailer by defendant.
His wife, co-plaintiff in this action, upon biting into the sandwich found
that it was crawling with maggots. She became ill and suffered injuries
for which she seeks damages on twin counts of negligence and breach
of implied warranty. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was granted
at trial. The supreme court reversed the court below and held, (1) that
there was a case of negligence for the jury and (2) that defendant was
liable in warranty since the legislative intent was that the implied war-
ranty of fitness raised by section 15 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act, should
inure in the case of footstuffs to the ultimate consumer, and that it was
not intended that strict "privity of contract" should be essential in an
action for its breach.
With this decision California joins a growing minority of states attack-
ing privity as it applies to the responsibility in warranty of manufacturers
or processors of foodstuffs to the ultimate consumer. Liability has been
founded in a number of these states on the technical grounds that the con-
tract between manufacturer and retailer, to the extent that it raises a
warranty of quality, is for the benefit of the ultimate consumer; 2 or that
such a warranty "runs with the goods";3 or that public policy renders the
23. Clayton Act passed in 1914; Illinois Act passed in 1925. Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443; American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council (1921) 257 U. S. 184.
24. See notes 11 and 21, supra, for the provisions of both acts.
25. For the economic argument on the other side of the question see the
dissenting opinion of Swing v. A. F. of L. (1939) 372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E.
(2d) 857, 860. Also see: (1939) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 722; (1935) 14 Ore. L. Rev.
501; (1939) 14 Temple L. Rev. 1; (1938) 8 Law Society Journal 306;
8 Intl Jurid. Assoc. Mthly. Bull. (Oct. 1939) no. 4, p. 1.
1. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd. (Cal. 1939) 93 P. (2d) 799.
2. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino (1928) 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557.
3. Coca-cola Bottling Works v. Lyons (1927) 145 Miss. 876, 111 So.
305; Biedenharm Candy Co. v. Moore (Miss. 1939) 186 So. 628; Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) 97 S. W. (2d) 761.
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manufacturer liable, apparently on some separate warranty made directly
to the consumer.4
The approach of the California court is novel in that it rests recovery
squarely on the provisions of section 15(1) of the Uniform Sales Act.5
In extending to the consumer of food the protection of the warranty of
fitness by the manufacturer to the retailer, however, the court is actually
indulging in judicial legislation. 6 On the other hand, since the Act clearly
raises the warranty, merely failing in section 69 to trace its subsequent
application,7 its inurement to the consumer might well be engrafted on the
terms of section 15 without undue violence to the legislative intent. It is
to be noted, though, that the warranty raised is only one of fitness for
resale. Does such a warranty afford adequate protection to the consumer?
While fitness for resale may coincide with fitness for consumption in most
cases involving food, it need not in all. For example, a defect common to
a given brand may possibly render an article unfit for consumption but
leave its fitness for resale unaffected.8 Moreover, if the consumer's rights
derive only from the warranty of fitness by manufacturer to retailer, they
are primarily dependent on its existence and secondarily subject to its
defects. A disclaimer by the manufacturer, 9 or proof that the retailer
did not rely on him,' 0 might operate to cut off recovery by the consumer
4. Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works (1931) 182 Pa. Sup. 516, 156 Atl.
537; Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1936) 230 Mo.
App. 275, 90 S. W. (2d) 445; Hertzler v. Manshum (1924) 228 Mich. 416,
200 N. W. 155. This last decision has been said to be limited by the terms
of section 15(1) in Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co. (1934) 267 Mich. 690, 255
N. W. 414, 416; and said to be limited to its facts in Paull v. McBride
(1935) 273 Mich. 661, 263 N. W. 877, 879.
5. "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether
he be grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
6. Among other things, where in the act itself does the court find justi-
fication for inferring a legislative intent to treat sales of foodstuffs differ-
ently from sales of other goods, as it implies in its holding? Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co. (Cal. 1939) 93 P. (2d) 799, 804. Nowhere does
the act refer to foodstuffs as a category apart.
7. Section 69, in enumerating the remedies available for breach of war-
ranty, provides for no one but the immediate buyer. But the maxim
exp ressio unius est exclusio alterius need not apply.
8. For example, boxes of candy of a given brand commonly containing
arsenic might be fit for resale as articles of the brand but unfit for con-
sumption.
9. See Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1939) 169
Misc. 879, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 110, 112, where the court says that such a
disclaimer by the impleaded defendant manufacturer is against public
policy.
10. Cf. Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co. (1934) 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414,
in which consumer's recovery was barred because there was no disclosure
by buyer to seller. The court does not make it clear whether the terms
"buyer" and "seller," with respect to the non-disclosure, refer, respectively,
to consumer and retailer, or to retailer and manufacturer. If the latter,
as seems probable, this case is parallel to one in which there is no reliance
by the retailer on the manufacturer.
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if the court's theory is rigorously adhered to.""
The question whether such a warranty originally arose is ignored by
this court and by courts generally, although its existence is a necessary
hypothesis underlying this approach. The usual procedure is to assume
that a warranty does exist and that its terms protect the consumer, with-
out bothering to inquire what sort of warranty it may be and what it
may cover. To make such an unverified assumption in all cases is in effect
to set up a warranty by the manufacturer directly to the consumer, inde-
pendent of the obligations he may or may not have assumed to his im-
mediate buyer? 2 But openly to impose liability on a warranty of this sort,
where the Sales Act is in force, would be to contravene the express terms
of section 15.13 On the other hand, to extend those terms to impose lia-
bility as an offshoot of the warranty of fitness to the retailer is to leave
at least theoretical chinks in the consumer's armor. A fastidious court
struggling to achieve adequate consumer protection within the terms of
the Sales Act is faced at once with this dilemma.
Considerations of public health impel the growing feeling that a manu-
facturer of food ought to guarantee to the consumer the wholesomeness
of his product-a feeling justified in fact by the superior position of the
manufacturer with respect to the discovery and prevention of defects, which
are ordinarily undiscernible or at least undiscerned by the consumer. 14
The potency of this feeling has thus far outweighed the legalistic mis-
givings, if any, in the minds of those courts which have dispensed with
requirements of privity. The present tendency of this minority is to im-
pose liability "because of," in disregard of, or if need be in spite of the
Uniform Sales Act.
A. C. G.
11. The objections here advanced apply with equal force to the theories
of a third party beneficiary contract and of a warranty which "runs with
the goods."
12. Cf. cases cited supra, note 4.
13. The first paragraph of section 15 reads: "Subject to the provisions
of this act and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty
or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows * * * "(italics supplied). Of the six subsections which follow, only 15(1) is
germane to the situation. But 15(1) provides for a warranty of fitness
between seller and buyer. The manufacturer, in these cases, is not seller
to the consumer; and the consumer, if buyer at all, is not buyer from the
manufacturer, but only from the retailer in a wholly separate sale. The
implication of any warranty directly by manufacturer to consumer flouts
the plain meaning of the act.
14. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1936) 230 Mo.
App. 275, 283, 90 S. W. (2d) 445, 450.
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